Saving the Bucs with Moneyball (Part 1)

I think the case could be made that the Pirates moves in the last two weeks have been filled with Moneyball principles, in a very good way. To me, this theory’s biggest argument is that there are market inefficiencies in baseball; traits that the market values too much, and other traits that the market doesn’t value nearly enough. A team in a financial position like the Pirates is at a great advantage when they can peg those inefficiencies ahead of the curve. From what I can remember, there are two areas in which the A’s were ahead of everybody else utilizing these inefficiency principles: on-base percentage and relief pitching. The Bucs, over the course of the last week, have tried to exploit different inefficiencies. To wit:

• Trading McLouth – the words that were continually thrown around to describe Nate were “All-Star” and “Gold Glove”. It has been covered ad nauseum that his Gold Glove was kind of a joke. I won’t make the argument that his All-Star appearance falls under the same umbrella; he deserved to make it with his great first half last year. However, to use this term to describe him is a bit misleading. Albert Pujols is an All-Star; Nate McLouth made an All-Star Game. There’s a difference to me, but the two are lumped together in media coverage and in the average fan’s mind. The baseball market overvalues terms like “All-Star” and “Gold Glove”. The Pirates exploited this.
• It seems that generally in baseball these days, prospects are also overvalued; teams are less willing to give up “the farm” in order to procure the best major league talent. The Bucs worked a trade that worked in the opposite order of this; of course the argument is that they didn’t get enough.
• To that last point, we look at the return for McLouth, where I believe the Bucs got commodities that are undervalued at the present time. We were able to get two pitchers; pitching is famously a rare commodity to receive in a trade. Further, the Bucs received a LHP who throws mid-90s. Lefties who throw this hard are also rare. In the outfield, they got a centerfielder; the famous axiom in baseball states that talent up the middle is difficult to obtain. Therefore, they were able to get three players that were undervalued by the Braves, because their positions are more difficult to fill.
• Along the lines of this, Gorkys Hernandez signals a trend toward which the Pirates are moving and which has been less valued in the majors: outfield defense. As Charlie at Bucs Dugout has recently shown, the improvement in the Bucs outfield defense has more or less made up for the loss of production by the Bucs OF with the bats. Trading McLouth and inserting McCutchen into the lineup improved what was already one of the top defensive outfields in the league (it could be argued it was the only way to improve on an already stellar outfield defense). Gorkys is a centerfielder who probably will be moved with McCutchen manning this position in Pittsburgh; he’s most likely the replacement for Nyjer (or whoever replaces Nyjer) whenever he is ready. Anything that he can develop with the bat over what Nyjer gives the Bucs (which is little) is a bonus.
  

These are all of the implications that Moneyball and its principles had on the trade that the Bucs completed last week. The average Bucs fan was irritated by this trade; it’s just the same old Pirates, trading big leaguers for prospects, shaving money off of the payroll. McCutchen will be traded in the offseason for four minor leaguers – I received an actual text that stated this. A couple of points about this, before moving on to the Bucs Moneyball draft:

• As stated before, McLouth was expendable. The Bucs actually were ahead of the curve because they traded him near his peak value. This is different from any trade in which the Pirates have previously engaged. Critics point to trades like the Bay and Nady trades of last season, the Kendall trade of 2004, the Aramis Ramirez trade in 2003, the Giles trade of 2004, and a litany of trades made in the 90s (when this procession of futility began). Let me comment on those each of those trades individually:

1. Jason Bay – not at his peak value; in fact, he was at about bottom value after the 2007 season (witness the package the Indians offered for him that offseason). The Bucs were lucky that he was as good as he was during 2008’s first half, increasing his value. At his age and contract situation, he was not a guy that was going to be part of the next great Bucco squad.
2. Xavier Nady – (and Marte if you want to throw him in) he was in the middle of his career season. His value was inflated, so by that standard, it is the most comparable to the McLouth trade. But Nady didn’t have a history of doing what he did in 2008; instead, his history was riddled with injury. It isn’t surprising that he hasn’t been anything like his April-June 2008 self since getting to the Yanks.
3. Brian Giles – he was on the decline, his contract was onerous, and the clouds of steroids have gathered over him since he left Pittsburgh. A return of Bay made this trade good enough.
4. Jason Kendall – one of the biggest contract blunders in a long list of contract blunders for the Bucs. They signed a singles hitter to a $60 million contract right before moving into PNC Park to signal a “commitment” to winning to the fanbase. The Bucs couldn’t get him and his bloated salary off the book quickly enough. This is the problem with allowing the fans to dictate moves made by the front office.
5. Aramis Ramirez - the only trade on this list that is indefensible and unacceptable. There is nothing I can say to make this trade feel better. The Bucs were under the gun to cut payroll immediately, and this is how they chose to do it. We could talk about the fact that A-Ram had been struggling for a season and a half before this trade, and how he wasn't at that time worth the salary that he was making. However, he was about 23 years old and to just give up on him was disappointing. There isn't really much else to say. When the current front office trades McCutchen for a decendant of Bobby Hill, then I will give up on them, but until then I will believe they won't make a trade like this.

This is just a short exposition on the Bucs, their front office, and how they are employing the techniques outlined in Moneyball. It is the first of a two part series. The second part will be posted some time this week, when I have a chance to hash out these thoughts, but it will focus on the draft, the minor leagues, international signings, and player development, in light of Moneyball principles.